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Compensation and Firm Performance
ABSTRACT
Therelatlons,ipbetween theceneatlon policies a fin, pura.s and
the fin's economic performance i of central hortance to both
researchersand practitioners.Yet,wt.ilea variety of theoriesexist
aboutthe effectsof variate. ensation policies, Mirprisingly little
evidenceexIsts a,.the extent towhichceneation policiesvary across
fireand,e inortantly,on th, effect. of pursiingalternative
ccensatjon strategies. This paper attewts to anarize theavalable
evidence, drawing on research from the economics, finance, and personnel
literatures. It alsolaysout an agenda for future research.
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The relationship between the ct.ipensation policies a firm pursues
and the firlirs econanic performance Is a central issue in industrial
relations. Yet, while a variety of theories exist abouttheeffects of
various ccuiipensatton policies, surprisingly little evidence exists on
the extent to which caipensation p01 cies vary across firms and more
inçortantly on the effects of puriing alternative cipensation
strategies.1 This paper attenpts to sim.uarize the available ejipirical
evidence and to lay out an agenda for future research.
The study of employee cawensation has a long history in the
literatures of labor econanics and personnel. Wages are at the core of
employment relationships; consequently, their determination is a
central issue of interest in both fields. At the risk of over
simplifying to draw a contrast, econciiilsts have tended to focus on wage
differentials and their correlates. Much of the work in the 40's and
So's examIned employer's wage policies and their relationship to
industry, union, regional and occupational characteristics.2 During the
1960s and 19?Os the association between human capital characteristics
such as age, experience, education, gender and the I Ike and wage
differentials were studied. Only recently has econaElsts' focus
shifted to why alternative censatIon policies mltt arise and their
effects on firm performance.
In contrast, the study of personnel has traditionally dealt with
the techniques involved in alninistration of eiç,loyee caipensation.
Much of this work focuses on caliparisonsof the properties of various
techniques,andtheir effects on employee work attitudes andbehaviors.3 Censation research in the personneliterature draws
heavily upon econanic and psychological theories. Studies report the
relationships of pay with employees' satisfaction, as well as their
decisions to apply, join and remainwitha firm. Further, relying
heavily on motivation theories, personnel research also examines
ciipensat'on's role as a reward or incentive to influence employee
performance. More recently, interest has expanded to examine the
effects that strategic choices ii,ccmpensationpolicies and practices
on finns'economicperformance, as well as employees' behavior
tudes.
effect of differences in compensation policies and practices
personnel p01 icies and practices operate directly upon other more
intermedLate variables such as employee behavior and perhaps on local
plant or subunit performance. These in turn affect overall economic
performance.
Granted some nieajres eilwloyed may be considered proxies for a




on the firm's thottan line1 is perhaps the most inportant measure of
their economic impact.bfriile the literature in both fields speculates
about the effects of various caipensation policies and practices on
firm performance little research has been directed to assess this
relationship. One reason for the lack of such research is that the
data required, detailed Individual compensation and performance data
gathered across firms, is difficult to collect. Another reason is that
relationship between any personnel system, be it conpensation. staffing
or training and a firm's economic performance is indirect. At best.$
sales revenues, Is an exawle. But typically thes. measures are
considered in terms of their effects on a firm's cciiipensatior,
decisions, such as its wage level and the shape of its employees'
experience—earning profile., rather than focusing on how cpensatIon
policies and changes an them affects a firm's financial performance and
its value to shareholders.4 As we shall discuss in the next section,
most of the work on the direct effects of cailpensation policies has
been limited to high—level executive cpensation. Beyond executive
pay, the plain fact is that we know very little about whether different
employee ctpensation policies and practices affect firm performance.
Speculation is rife; research rare.
At the onset, it is lucortant to stress that calcensation policies
may vary on several dimensions. First, the 'level' of clI,en.atlon
varies. From a policy perspective, the level refers to the average
cuiensatjon paid Dy a firm relative to that paid by its competitors.
Evidence suggests that firms pursue different policies, some lead,
others match and still others pay less than their cetitors. hiy the
levelof conç.ensation should vary across finite, has been the subject of
considerable research by economists.5 However,whilethe consequences
of afirm's relative compensation level on Its ability to attract.
motivate and retain a stable workforce has received ewirical
attention, the consequences for the firm's financial performance has
notbeenstudied.6
Second, it is well known that the caiensation structure varies
firms.7Structures refer to the distribution of rates or
internal pay hierarchies. In Sr finns, the hl.est paid work4
receivesover 100 times the c.Tjpensation of the lowest paid and the
differentials in other finns may be less than ID times, Of importance
to us is the implications of these different structures for employees
work behaviors and firm performance.8
A third dimension of a firm's caiiensation strategy pertains to
the forms or the mix of various elements of total censation. Total
cc.,pensatjon may include base pay, a variety of Incentive schemes,
COLAs, various farmsofstock options and an Increasing array of
benefits. Firms differ in terms of the number of pay forms offered.
the degree to which employees are offered a choice among different
forms, the relative Importance of each form (e.g. base wage/total
canpensatlon ratio or incentive/base wage ratio,) and the proportion
of the workforce eligible for each form beyond the legal requirements,
Ce.. in sane firms all employees receive profltsharlng, in others only
a handful of executives are covered). Various types of employee
benefits, such as pensions, may have Important Incentive effects that
can influence employee behavior and firm performance.9
Fourth, policies for granting cpensation Increases vary among
firms and, even within a firm, among occupational groups. Scme firms
grant increases across the board, based strictly on time worked, while
others base increases on incentive mechani.uis such as profit—sharing,
team awards, gain—sharing, or pay for individual performance. Such
performance—basedschemes vary widely. Someemphasize the short term,
(e.g.merit pay increases and bonus awards to key performers) others
long term (e.g. stock options). Sciefirms use subjectivemeasure of
performance(e.g. merit ratings, project cletion), others used5
quantitative meaakres <unit, produced, return on equity, stock value).
the unit of analysis employed in performance n,eaairement also vary
(e.g. individual employee, work teams or cells and unit/organization
wide). Some extend eligibility to cover all employees, others limit
participation depending on the incentive plan Involved. Once again,
the effects of such differences on the performance of the firm is not
well investigated)0
Finally, the or bywhichcompensation is athlnisteredalso
differs. AU,iinistratiye processes may vary on several dimensions.
Anng these are the extent to which pay Information (e.g.. rates,
ranges, rationales, market data) is disclosed to employees, the nature
of employee participation in the determination and alministratlon of
pay, the existence of dispute resolution proceóares and the degree to
which policy design and implementation is decentralized. Scme firms
have formalized job evaluation systems that aid In determining internal
pay hierarchies, while other firms allow for considerable wage
flexibility across positions. Some firms operate in a unionized
environment: others do not. Similarly, some allow for employee
participation and disclosure in compensation decisions, while others do
not. Since several papers in this volume address these latter two
differences, our treatment of them will be brief.11
These five basic dimensions of cnpensation policy——the level,
reflectingthe competitivenessof total couipensation; the structure
reflectingthe internal pay hierarchies; the mix of different
compensation forms; the nature of pay increases and the process








































examining the relationship between catipensation and ft
But disentangling the effects of each of these dimensi
difficult and perhaps unfeasible task. It is possible
economic performance is affected by its ccoipensation
If this is the case then we need
policy dimensions simultaneously
decisions. Empirically, a firi's
measured as a tt. of interrelated











issue is how to measure












the industry performance measures
measurement of firm performance is found in the Becker—Olson paper in
this volume.)
As noted earlier, studies of non—executive employeecompensation
havenot examined how compensationpolicies or practices (or changes in
them)affectthe overalleconomic well—being of an organi2ation. The
unstatedpremise underlying these studies is that ccensation systems
can directly affect variables such as employee productivity,7
absenteeio.turnover and job satisfaction. The issue of the indirect
effects of caipensation policies and practices on more general
accounting or market return measures has been left unaddressed.It is
possible that direct affects can be observed only for executive jobs
where decisions may directly affect econcelic measures, while decisions
by non—executive employees have at best very distant relationships to a
firms performance.
It s important to stress that a causal relationship between
crensatlonpolicyand firmperformancecannot be inferred directly
from simple correlations of the two variables. So, for example, a
positive correlation betweenwage levelsand firm profitability might
indicate that a high wage policy causes high profits gj that high
profitsprovide a surplus ihichworkers can share In the form of high
wages. ht.lle saneof the studies we discuss below provide correlations
between firm performance and co.wensation policies, very few actually
provideconvincin; evidence that coiiipensatlon policy affects firm
per formance.
Webeginin the next section with a discussion of the evidence on
the relationship between the compensation of high—level executives and
firm performance. Thereisa substantial body of research findings
here that draw heavily on both the finance and economics literature.
Section III discusses the evidence on employeecpensationand firm
performance; in the main the research findings here draw heavily frau
the human resource and personnel literatures, although the economic5
literature also has sthir.g to add. Finally, section IVprovidesa8
sumaryof what we have learned from these literatures and a discussion
of research Issues that still need to be addressed.
11.ExecutiveCensation
Given the widely (but as we will see below not always correctly)
perceived separation between the ownership and management of
corporations, concern has been expressed that corporate executives may
pursue objectives such as sales maximization, growth maximization, or
market share maximization that are not necessarily in thebest
interestsof shareholders who are concerned with short run (accounting
profits) and long—run (total stock market return) measures of the
economic profitability of the corporation. Theoretical models that
seek optimal ways to resolve this Drincinal—ant problem, that Is ways
to provide incentives for executives to take actions that are In the
best interests of shareholders, always come to the conclusion that
executive compensation somehow should be structured to provide such
i ncentiyes. 12
Earlyempirical studies ofexecutivecompensation were cross-
section in nature and focused on whether across firms, executive
compensation was more highly correlated with sales or accounting
profits. Inthemainthecorrelations with sales were highest
suggesting, atfirst glance, that corporate executives' ca,ensation
was not structured in such a way to maximize stockholders' well—
being.13 However, these correlationsmay reflect only that arge firj
employ more ab'e executives and thus nnast pay them more. These9
correlationsthen, tell us little abouttheincentives facing any given
executive at a point in time.
Note recently, a number of studies have used longitudinal data and
examtned whether changes in tøp level executives' caTpensation tends to
be correlated with changes In the economic performance of firms.14 The
aefinition of economic performance varies across studies. Salle use
accounting measures like reported profits, while others use measures of
the total return on a firm's securities; salle use absolute performance
measures while others use performance measures relative to other firms
in the same industry (most theoretical models suggest that executive
performance should be measured net of industry effects). The
definition of censatlon also varies; salle use salaries and bonuses,
*ile others try to include the values of stock options exercised
and/ordeferred payments.
Virtually all of these studies find, however, that changes In
executivecamensation are hiiy positively correlated with the
econanicperformance measures. That is.corporate executives'
caipensationdoes seemtobe at least inplicitlystructuredin a way to
providethem with incentives to maximize the economic performance of
their firms. Several studies also show that relatively poor economic
performance in one yeat is associated with a higher probability of
executive turnover in later years; this further siggests that
incentives that operate in the cortect direction exist.5
Of course to say that a correlation exists between executives
censation changes and their firms' economic performance Is in Itself
not evidence that tying their compensation to performance will lead to10
improved economic performance. One possibility is that corporations
initially don't know what the true productivity of their executives
are. However, to the extent that executives productivity can be
imperfectly sional Led by corporate performance1 relating their
ccoipensation to corporate performance is a way of 'paying them ithat
they're worth', If this is occurring, the cnensation—performance
nexus would reflect learning about executives' 'true ability' over
time, not necessarily any Incentive arrangement to stimulate economic
performance,16 Furthermore, even if appropriate incentives exist,
it doesn't necessarily follow that they will have their intended
effect.
Disentangling whether the observed correlation is ae to
incentives" or 'learning" is not an easy task. One study that
attempted to do this used InformatIon on the stage of the executives'
careers (presumably earning occurs primarily at early stages) and the
variability of executives' ccaçensation over their life cycles (if
learning a, driving the process, an executive's variability in earnings
should decline over time) and concluded that while both 'incentives'
and 'learning" may exist, there was sane evidence that 'learning
effects were most wortant,7 Other studies, however, showed that the
correlationof measures of performance and comipensation growth were
highest for better performing firms,which is atleast suggestive that
better incentives in executive compensation do lead to better corporate
performance. '
Anotherstrand of research, which draws heavily on thefinance
literature, focuseson particular provisions. ofexecutiveca,ipensationII
agreementsandexamines whether adoption of such provisions is
associated with abnormally high stock market returns forshareholders.
For exaile, studies of the adoption of executive stock option plans
and executiveincentive cropensation agreements based on short—run or
long—run accounting profits measures have all shown thatthe
announcement of the plan, lead to increases inshareholderwealth.19
Atleastone study has alsofoundthat corporate capital investments
tend to tncrease after the adoption of long—run executive incentive
calipensation (or performance plan) agreements.20
At leastthree explanations can be given for these findings. The
first is that these provisions S have favorable incentive effects and
that the increases in shareholder wealth reflect anticipated increases
in profits that will occur &e to the adoption of the provisions.
The second is thatthese provisions are proposedby management and
adoptedby boarofdirectors only when management believes management
will benefitfr the provisions. As such their adoption siiaIs to
the market that management expects good times are ahead; this would
havea positive effect onshareholder wealth (since It conveys new
positiveInformation) even If no incentive effects wereInvolved.
Finally, the provisions may be adopted for Sareasons.To the
extent that capital gains historically have been taxed at lower rates
than earned ince (at least up until 1987). adoption of stock option
plans may have allcc.ted corporations to provide management with
increased (or equal to preadoption) after—tax cçensatIon levels at
l.,ertotal costs to the corporation.Ifthis occurred shareholder
wealthwouldofcourseincrease.12
Asabove, disentangling c.A.ich subset of these expanatlons I,
'correct'is a difficult task. One study has provided some evidence in
favor of the incentive hypothesis.2t Specifically, it found that the
adoption of forms of stock option plans that do not have tax advantages
led to increases in shareholder wealth, that boards of directors'
statements often claimed anticipated incentive effects would result
fran stock option adoptions, and that privately held firms often have
stock option plans for executives. The former two forms of evidence,
however, do not enable one to strongly discriminate between the
incentive and s,cnallinn hypotheses.
To take another example, a second set of studies has analyzed
golden parachute'agreements; agreements that provide for (often
substantial)calipensation for a corporate executive ifa change In
ownershipofvotingstock and/orshift in the majority ofthe board of
directors of a corporation occurs that leads to the termination of the
executive's enployment. No hypotheses have been put forthfor the
existenceof these agreements. On the one hand, these arrangements may
increase the costs of takeover bids and reduce their probability of
occurring. This would make the executive's position more secure but
would not necessarily be in the best interests of shareholders; in a
senseit is argued then these agreements transfer wealthfrom
shareholdersto management.
On the other hand, one might argue that these plans help to alii
theincentivesof executives and shareholders. By protecting
management fran harm, they encourage executives to negotiate takeovers
that increase the value of shareholders' equity, This protection isLa
particularly important in situations in which management censatiori
has been structured so that cnpensation increases withtenure,with
part of this increase being a deferred reward for prior performance.
Such deferred canpensation schemes prove to be optimal In a theoretical
sense in situations in which estimates of an executive's performance
are very "noisy•' butimprovewith his tenure.22
In fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that on balance
the second hypothesis is the correct one; the adoption of "golden
parachute agreements appears to be associated empirically with
favorable security market response (i.e., positive excess returns in
the short—runL23 ile suchevidencecannot disentangle the incentive
al i.....nthypotheses from the hypotheses that such adoptions simply
si,alsituations In which takeover bids,andhence excess returns, are
likely, it Is Interesting that another study found that executives'
tenure—earning profiles wre steeper in firmsthat had golden parachute
agreementsthan they were in firms that did not, ceteris paribus.24
That Is, In situations where deferred caipensation appeared to be more
important,goldenparachutes were more likely to exist.
One mist caution, however, that all of the studies that find an
associationbetween the adoptionofparticular provisions of executive
calipensat 'on agreements and abnormally hI stock market returns are
drawing conclusions about the effect,vene of executive incentive
canpensationagreements fran short—run changes in stock market prices.
Many of these provisions are designed to encourage executives to take
the long—run interests of the firm into account when decisions are
made. Yet surprisingly, save for Larker's (3983) study, it appears14
that these studies do not address whether the adaption of these
provisions actually alters executives' decisions in any systematic way
or leads to higher long—run accounting profits.
in addition to the research described above on the relationship
between executive ccnpensation and firm performance in the for—profit
sector of the economy, a number of studies have examined the
relationship between executive ceijipensation and 'performance in the
public ana nonprofit sectors of the econny. Of course. in the absence
of a profit—maximiztng objective, performance is much harder to define
in these sectors. Essentially each of these studies defined 'that it
considered to be a reasonablemeasure of performance and then sought to
ascertainifexecutive coiwensation and/or turnover was related to this
performance measure ceteris paribus. That is. these studies asked if
the censat on of executives in the public and nonprofit sectors was
structured in such a way to encourage executives to try to Improve the
performance measure.
For example, one study of the censatlon of chief business
agents of local building trade unions, who are salaried officers
resonsible (among other things) for negotiating contracts, found that
their salaries tended to be positively related to the relative wage
advantages their members had over 'members of the same union in other
cities and over other building trades union members in the same city.25
Thus, incentives appear to have existed for the business agents to try
to maximize their members' wage Increases.
A second study focused on appointed municipal government
officials, specifically city—managers, and pal ice and fire department15
chiefs. Performance in thisstudy was defined in term, of how well
the officials were doing relative to what might be expected given the
socioeconco,ic characteristic, of the city ——orIlre precisely, by
resi&als from estimated 1output equationr.Positive performance
the three officials were assumed to be, respectively, lower than
predicted property tax rates buthigher than predicted expenditure
levels (which could occur oliwitaneously only Ifthecity-managerwas
goodatattracting aid fri higher levels of government), lower than
prefficted cr,me rates, and better than predicted fire insurance
ratings. For all three types of executives, salaries were positively
correlated across areas, ceteris paribus, with the performance
measures, again suggesting that somne incentives for the officials to
perform' existed.
A third study of this type focused on public school district
for
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assumedto be those inwhich student
predictedvalues, given the character
taxrates werelower thanpredicted,
characteristics.In this longitudina
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ngful Incentive toperform (as defined) existed.
studies all tried to infer if the inpllcit
compensation in these public and nonprofit16
sector positionsprovidedincentives for the executives to pursue
specified performance objectives, none actually examined if the
existence of these Incentives did lead to liwroved performance. One
recent study, however, was able to observe several measures of
performance of local social security adninistration offices both before
ana after the adoption of formal meritpayplans that partially tied
managerial salary increases to these performance measures.28 Using a
quasi—experimental design and statisttcal prooeajres to eliminate
trends and cycles in the performance measires, the study found that the
adoption of the merit pay plans led to no short—run effects on
performance, the authors noted, however, that the system was stflIn
its early stages and that effects mlt possibly be observed after it
became more institutionalized and better understood.
In concluding this section, it is interesting to note that there
appear to be no studies In either the private—for—profit, nonprofit, or
public sectors on how the level of executive compensation affects
economic performance. Similarly, there are no studies of how the
rewards for seniority, probabilities of pranotion, or salary structure
across executive positions within a firm affect economic performance.
That is. we do not know whether paying hi, salaries to attract and
retain high quality executives 'pays', whether offering executives
rewards for seniority "pays', whether offering within—firm promotional
opportunities (e.g., franvicepresident to president or from president
to chief executive officer), 'payV and thether the caipensation levels
across executives within a firm are structured in such a way to
encourageimproved firm performance.29I?
ILL. loveeCensation
Thepurpose of this section of the paper is to examine the
literature pertaining to a firm's ccmpensation policies for employees
not covered under executive pay systems and the relationsiap of these
policies to the performance of firms.
Evidence of variations in the censation policies and practices
of firms can be found in several scarce,. Typically the data are
incomplete, collected for other purposes, or of limited use for
determining any direct effects of compensation on firm performance.
Sufficient signs of differences in firm's policies do exist and they
are considered in terms of the basic dimensions discussed earl icr.
Certainly, differences in pay levels and the cspetitive position
among firms is well established in both the economics and personnel
literatures. Reports iss'ed by private consulting firms that survey
enployer practices detail differences in pay levels by characteristics
of the firm e.g. in&stry, revenues, workforce size), Job (e.g.
function. cescription. job evaluation points and number of incumbents)
and geography and Area Was &zrvevs conjcted by the Bureau of Labor
Statisticsalso show wide variations inwages within narrowly defined
Jobclassifications in a metropolitan area.30
One study, which had access to a private consulting firm's survey
data frau aerospace ccqanles, reported that after controlling for
firm size (number of employees and revenues), substantial variations
existed in the average salaries paid among these firms (e.g the two
highest paying finns paid more than 16 percent above the market average
w,tch the average paid by the lowest two was more than 11 percent below18
the market average).31 These firms
ciipetitive positEons for different
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Theefficiency wage literature Ineconallics suggests various
reasonswhy saoe enIoyers night set higher wages than their
canpetitorsfor employees of equal quality. Examples include
differencesin turnover costs, differences in the need f or close
supervision (so—cal led 'worker shirking') and difference in employee
ccuiultment. Evidence of different pay levels within a product market
or industry is also widely available in studies of iritra-industry wage
differentials. Thanns (1906) study of the effects of firm size on wage
levels in the plastics industry, Groshen's 0906) study of employer
effects on wage dispersion in plastics, industrial chemical and woolen
yarn industries, and Leonard's (19%) study of wages in California's
high—technology sector are recent examples.
Generally these studies confirm earlier findings. For example, it
is wellknown that differences In Intra—industry wage rates are
correlated with firm size. Numerous explanations are ccuipnonly advanced
to explain this relationship including (1) larger firma use more
advanced technoiogies and require greater employee skills and
discipline. (2) cc.lensating differentials are required to offset the
greater disutility of working in larger firm,, (3) labor unions in
largerfirms have been able to appropriate sane of the firm's higher
profits,and (4) large firmspayhigherwages torethce e,çloyee
shirking and thus supervisioncosts. Note that theseexplanations
inlythat a firm's econquicperformanceand theconditions It faces
permit, or provide econanic Incentives for It to adopt a particular pay
posture. Unless one tautolocloally accepts these explanations as
valid, however, they do DQtIprovideany evidence that a firm's pay20
el/el, as part of its overall canpensation strategy, actually has had
any effect on its econanic performance.
Sane survey evidence, thouilimitedIn coverage, compares the
canpensation policies of high tech firms with 'traditional' fErms. In
one study forty percent of both the high tech firms and traditional
firms reported foIloing policies in which their pay level matched
their competition. About 20 percent In each group reported they lead
the:r competitors and the rest fol loijed ('less than market averages).
Obviously caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these data:
they are based on reports of cauipensatlon managers and the mechanics
used to translate a poZicy into practice often vary. For example, two
thirds of the firms reported they matched their range mioints with
the median rate paid in the market. However, the specific firms
included in such calculation often vary, the surveys used differ, aria
differences in average rate paid by firms may be due to demographic
differences in each firm's workforces (e.g. seniority) rather than any
intended cetittve policy differences.
Considered together, the consultant survey information, the
anecdot& accounts, the economic research and the personnel surveys
support the contention that employers' characteristics are related to
the dispersion flpaylevel and to a firm's relative cai'ensatlon
position among its competitors. But we are interested in evidence on
the effects of differences in relative compensation policy on firms'
financial performance or shareholder value. And here the research
literature is lean.2!
Our search of the literature yielded very few studies of the
effects of different pay levels on performance measres such as
ccnpensatlon—to—revenue ratios. labor cost—to—total cost ratios or
shareholder value. One Suomers' (1906) case study of what happened to
FordMotor Canpany when Henry Ford lntro&ced the$5/day wage In the
early 20th century. found that while absenteeis,i, voluntary turnover,
ann discharges declined after the wage increase and productivity
increased, these changes probably were not sufficiently large In
themselves to allow one to conclude that the new policy Kpaid for
itselP. A second Abowas' (1985) study of recent union wage
settlements. found that unexpectedly high union wage settlements were
reflected virtually dollar for dollar in changes in shareholder value
(see the Becker and Olsen piece in this volume tor more details).
Thus, higher than expected wage settlements do not appear to improve
firm performance. Finally, interin&stry studies of the determinants
of wage levels that specify that high profits cause high wages rather
than vice versa, typically do find that Industry profit levels are an
important explanatory variable In wage equations.36
A few studies do examine the effects of pay level on eiiiployee and
employer recruiting and turnover behaviors. For example m evidence
suggests that establishing a relatively high pay level increases the
applicant queue permitting firms to select higher quality and thus
potentially more projctive employees. Evidence on the
wage/recruitment expenditure relationship seen. contradictory. One
study reports that high pay levels and high recruiting costs are
substitutes, while another suggests they are clple1lnts ——that22
employers who offer relatively hi,er wages also exhibit relatively
greater recruiting expenses.7 Thus, employers that search more are
likely to pay more. But the evidence here is drawn from limited low—
level occupational groups and only limited industry and firm
characteristics are considered. Obviously more work is needed, perhaps
under certain conditions (e.g., critical jobs or long—term unfilled
vacancies), pay levels and recruiting costs are complements, while
under others they are used as substitutes.
Sane evidence of the effects of pay level on job seekers and
employees choice behavior is also available. For example, studies of
the correlations between wage levels and turnover and absentee,su have
already been cited. Wage levels also appear to be an important factor
when job seekers have a wide range of pay levels fran which to choose
and higher paid workers, ceteris DariSis, report they put more effort
into their jobs and are more sattsfked. Research also exists that
shows that higher military pay leve's Increase the flow of volunteers
to the armed forces.39
Another dimension of a firms' cailpensatton strategy is its
internal wage hierarchy. Wage hierarchies differ across firms in
different industries that employ differing technologies. For examp'e.
Dreweries have relatively flat hierarchies compared to steel or
automotive firms. But within an industry or firm, managers have
considerable latitude in the design of wage structures. Relatively
flat structures (e.g. fewer grades and wider pay ranges) tend to
obscure differences in task and/or skiIirequirements and offer
managers flexibility in deploying the workforce without necessarily23
requiring pay changes. Greater hierarchical arrangements e'iiphasaze
greater specification of work rules and Sail requirements and tend to
require pay adjustments mare often.
Wage structures possess several characteristics. including the
number of levels, the differentials betweenlevelsand the distribution
of ewloyees among the levels. There is a tendency, especially in
larger organizations for the nwter of employees being paid higher
wagesto be less than the numberpaidlowerwages. Several atterrpts to
examinethis feature have been reported. Forexample,one study used
theLorenz curve as an analog and carpared the distribution of
annualized salaries bY cumulative percent of the workforce across
firms.40 Others analyzed the nature of the differentials between
levels in the hierarchy. At least one study found the functional form
of differentials between hierarchical levels to be a constant
proportion.41 Another, based on the analysis of the discretionary
content of work andnorms ascribed to enployees, reports pay ratios of
1.3$between adjacent managerial levels.42
Another feature of pay hierarchies is that wages often tend to be
associated with jobs rather than individual eflployees. Thus deploying
workers to new jobs often necessitates wage changes. The alternative
systeii of wages being tied to workers, regardless ofthe job performed,
underlies knowler ba Day and aturltycurve arran...nts.
to date, no atte.ipts to systematically examine the effects of Job—based
as ccupared to employee—based pay structures have been conducted.44
There Is also a tendency, at least in larger firms,fora large
proportion of eloyees In hi,er paid jobstohave been prctnoted fri24
lower paid joos within the same firmandfor new hires to enter at
specific points in the hierarchy. Auninistrative proceJres documented
as part of internal labor markets serve to reQulate these promotions
an wage hierarchies.45 Finally there is ,ne evidence that pay rates
rise with seniority and experience and that the variance of earnings
increases with experience and age.
The literature contains many explanation! for these feature. at
pay hierarchies. Theoretically, variations In internal wage
hierarchie, are seen as influencing a wide array of employees'
behaviors.7 These include their decisions to file grievances, invest
in training, take on added responsibilities, improve their performance.
turnover, form unions and the like. But to ourknowledge 112 attention
has been devoted to examining empirically the effects of variations in
the pay hierarchies and workforce profiles on firms'performance.
Recent news report,do describe caoesof employers' attempts to
re1ce labor casts and improve prothctivity by modifying their pay
hierarchies. They report drastic reductions in thenuiiter of levels
(grades)in the pay structure as wI I as workforce reduction schemes
aimed not only at shrinking the overallworkforce level but
reconfiguring the distribution of employees within the structure (e.g.
earlyretirement programsand demotions). But systematic study of the
effects ofthese events has not been reported.
Arenewed interest in wage hierarchies within firmshasalso
occurred among labor economists. However, mostof this work hasbeen
at the theoretical level; empirical research is much sketchier.48
Economistshave found that union policies produce reductionsin the25
dispersion at the plant level; wage dispersion within unionized firms
(measured as standard deviations of the log of wages) averages 1/3 less
than In non—union firms.49Considering the effects of within—firm
wage differentials, this same study found that the wider the dispersion
the more I ikey union certification drives wil I be successful. Studies
of this type, however, provide little direct evidence on how wage
differentials influence firm performance.
We turn next to research that addresses the impact that different
methods used f or determining pay increases have on performance. Much
of this work focuses on crAiçaring different methods (e.g. merit versus
across the board) rather than cnparing different caitlnatlons or mixes
of approaches in total cmpensation. For example, a recent survey by
the Conference Board reports that merit pay plans (performance
appraisal based) are in widespread use for exempt eiiployees.50 Perhaps
the most tefling result of the survey, which was based on responses
fr caipensation directors,
in the features of the merit
plans were Ivery successful'
Nfailure.
Typical of the research
performancein organizational
payincrements were based on
carlng nurses In two hospi
is that there were no apparent differences
plans between those who claimed their
and those claiming theirs to be a
studies are those that ciipared employee
units with merit pay to those in which
COLAs and/or seniority. In studies
tals Cone with COLA and seniority based
Increases, theother with ment)andin twopapermills(one withCOLA
anc seniorityIncreasestheotherinwhich a meritplanreplaceda
COLA/seniorityplan), the employeeswere reportedto bemore productive26
In the merit based units.5'In another study, the discontinuation of
an incentive plan among welders in a manufacturing firm resulted in a
temporary decrease in their productivity. And in a series of studies
of tree plantets, lumber jacks and fur trappers, incentive based plans
were found to be increased performance over previous levels or when
canpared to hourly straight time pay with seniority basea Increases.52
Merit pay did not fare as well in studies in the pubLic sector.53
The most elaborate of these was the longitudinal analysis of the
effects of the Federal Ierat System in the Social Security
Anninistration, which we discussed brieflyri section U. Unit level
performance data e.g. monthly series of types of claims processed and
time to process) were collected and while the results were not
unajitiguous ie to court challenges that delayed the implementation of
the merit plan and low merit budget funding, the authors concluded that
the merit pay plan did not have any discernable affect on unit
performance. Several reviews of merit pay plane in public education
a190 concluded that there is no systematic evidence that the
institution of merit pay plane for teachers lead to any improvements of
teaching and, more importantly, to improvements in student
performance .
Unfortunatelyboth the private and public sector studies utilize
nonrigorous quasi—experimental designs and suffer fran methodological
and/or measurement problems (e.g. selection bias, uncontrolled
variables). This leads us to conclude that we know very little about
the effects of merit pay schemes on enployee performance and even less
about their effects on firms' financial well being.27
It should beunderstood,however just howgreata gap exists
betweentheoriesofpay for performance and howItactually gets
practiced.Personnel researchers have long recognized this gap. Many
'meritpay'schemesareunderfunded, fail to offer pay increases that
are meaningful to employees and fail to establish a clear relationship
between performance andpayincrements. Further, only a relatively
uaIl share of most employees canpensatlon is contingent on
performance under these plans. So the poor Sowangofmerit pay
schemesshouldnot cl,e astoo much of a surprise.
Thegapbetweentheory and practice appears to differ by
occupation. Sales incentive plans appear to be more consistent with
theory than the merit plans often usedfor managers or professionals.
Thissuggeststhatsales jobsmay offeran attractive opportunity to
studytheeffects of various pay for performance approaches.
Another series of studies correlates earnings levels with previous
earnings, experience. performance ratings, ejcation and other
factors.55 Using data collected within firme,theyall reached similar
conclusions: that pay level is weakiy or not significantly correlated
with performance rating and is more strongly related to seniority and
education. For example, one study reported that earnings were more
attributable to experience than performance, butit failedto report if
thethree firms, whichprovidedthe data,usedmerit based pay.56 Other
studies reportea loi.correlationsbetween performance ratings and
salary levels for managers Infourprivate and three public
organizations.5728
Correlations in these studies reveal very little aboutthenature
of pay—performance relationship. It is the increments in pay, not the
pay eve), that merit pay plans to use to affect performance. Not
unexpectedly then, the correlation between the changes in pay f or
managers and thetr performance rating in one study was very much higher
(.65) than the correlation betweenperformanceand pay level <.25)58
Obviously, none of these correlation studies sheds lit on the effects
meritpay may haveon individual or firm performance, Hogever, in
spite of the failure to distinguish between pay level and changes In
pay, many still refer to the weak pay level—performance relationship as
proof that merit pay does not affect performance.59
A few studies considered the effects of the all of different forms
of compensation or,employeeperformance. In one, merit pay and bonuses
(individual oriented pay increases), were found to be less effective
than profltsharing, stock o.rnership, and team based bonuses.60 Of
the latter three, team based bonus were reported to be nesteffective.
This study a'so suffers fri,limitations similar to most pay—
performance studies; effectiveness was measured in terms of managers'
percept ions of turnover, ability to attract and the like rather than by
more objective measures. Further the authors recognize that the study
is based on a convenient sampie and that data imitations did not
permit them to control for different provisions in the incentive plans
suchassize of awards, eligibility, timing etc.
Two other studies contrast the earnings of workers paid by the
hout and those paia byapiece—rate scheme. The first found that among
18$ male punch—press operators in Chicago. workers paid by the piece100000 employees in 500
clothing inoustries and
approximately 14 percent
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where their earnings opportunities are greatest.
firms offering piece—rate plans potentially benefit
plans induce any given worker to work harder but
heyserve to help attract higher quality workers.
studies,however, draw anyconclusions abait the
plans on the current profitability or stock market
irms.
nterestIn, and even popularity of, gainsharing and
ty sharing schemesisevident in industrial
dely perceived as an approach throu, which pay
increases can successfully affect groupand unit performance,so
proponents claim the plans hold considerable promise and even
demonstrated success. The benefits ascribed to these plans include
Increases Ln employee and firm productivity and profitabflity. reduced
costs, improved product quality reduced absenteein and tardiness.
better use of capital assets and the facilitation of employee—
management cooperation, caiinitment and trust.64
pro&ctivity gains will engender suggestion
and motivate addedperformance.Typically
the form of bonuses and are not tolled into
increases in cth,lpensatlon costs vary direct
Unfortunately,much of theliterature
testimonial andanecaotai.The substantive
gainsharing have c1ie intwowaves. The fi
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'ninn aata of this type, the NYSEOfficeof Econcaic Research
conclude 'On the basis of the evidenceandthetheoryCeøçhasisadded),
it appears that gainsharing can play an inportant role in motivating
people to be mote productive.1
The other survey, a GAO Report, concluded that the results of
pro&ctivlty sharing plans suggest that these plans offer a viable
method of enhancing productivity and at the firm level.' This
conclusion was based on information obtained from interviews with 36
firms. However of these, only 24 fIrms provided some financial data,
only 9 fInns indicated they made formal assesnent of these plans
and only 4 of these could document their analyses. Nevertheless, the
oft quoted GAO results are that gainsharing i'Teroved performance by
17.3% at 13 firms with sales less than 100 million and in the II ftrms
with sales of 100 million or greater, the average inprovement was
16.4%. Na, seriously one S,ould take these results is obviously open
to question. Beyond these two surveys and some earlier evaluation
studies, case descriptions of applications dominate the llterature.6?
Schuster's work C1984a, 1984b) is an exception. Bereports
longitudinal case studies of the effects of gainsharing schemes, the
Scanlon plan, and theRuckerplan.In the most thorou. study1
productivity(measured as output per hour),,eloyment. voluntary
turnover, and suggestion rates by employeeswerecollected on a monthly
basis over approximately seven years.Basedon a time—series design,
theresults revealed an inmiediate upward shift in prottictivity and
suggestions upon irelementation ofaScanlon plan, followed by a32
slitly positive trend thereafter. In other studies of four Scanlon
and two Rucker applications, similar flndln were reported.
This 'plateau effect. an abrupt positive shift in performance
followed by a slii,t positive trend or steady performancelevel, is
consistentwith observations in the earlier descriptive literature.
Schuster notes that other coincidental changes (e.g., capital
improvements, newunionor management leader,, etc.) mayhaveaffected
productivity to a greater degree than the gainsharing schemes did. He
attenpts to account for these possibilities throui rather exhaustive
interviews of the parties involved and analysis of capital expenditure
data during the study periods.
A nuoterofmonographson profi tsharing have been published by the
Profit Sharing Research Foundation.68 Most of them describe various
profitsharing applications and theirsupporting philosophies. A few
cpparethe financia' performance of firii with profitoharing to TMnon—
profitsharers .Inone study by Howard and Dietz <1969), financial
performance measures usedinclude levsln and tren in operating
incne,vanous rates of return, earnings per en,loyee, earnings per
share. aivadends per share, and market price per share. Nine
tndustries were selected using a four—digit SIC classification and data
were collected fran CONPUSTAT tapes for the 1948—66 period. The
analyses caupared the financial performance of profitsharers with non—
profttsharers. Profitsharers exhibited superior performance in 50
percentof thecases and inferior performance In about 24 percent.
Howardand Dietz concluded that "the financia' performance of$$
profitsharing cawanies was clearly superior to non—profitsharers for
the nine industries as a group.'
Limitations in COMPUSTAT data did not permit accounting for
systematic differences beyond profitsharing that could account for the
observed performance differences. Beyond such obvious ones as capital
expenditures, technological and product differences, a variety of
critical cclm,ensation and personnel factors need to be considered. A
few of the more obvious ones are differences in pay levels, employment
levels, other incentive schemes and whether profltsharing was
considered part of an eiiployees total cailpensatton (thus placing a
portion of it 9at risk" in a manner similar to gainsharing) or a
benefit (thus placing it along with pensions as an entitlement). Put
another way, simple clpartsons of mean outcalies tell us little about
the effects of profiteharing.
Our overall conclusion in this section echoes the conclusion in
our am.nary of the executive caiensation literature. It Is well known
that the basic dimensions of employee cc.wensation strategies differ
widely across organizations. Yet there are few rigorous studies of
whether these differences make a difference. We do not know if a
farm's pay position relative to Its cetltors. the nuither of pay
grades It offers, pay differentials between these grades, or the
profile of employees In a firm's pay hierarchy make any difference
regarding employee behavior or the firm's economic performance.
There is evidence that indivijal and group based incentive plans
do affect employee performance but even it is not unambiguous. We do
notknow whether changes in the mix of total compensation pay off.34
Does it pay to shift fran a base pay system that emphasizes
entitlements (emphasis on seniority, COLA's, across the board increases
and economic security) to a contingency based system with emphasis on
short and long term incentives such as gairisharing, team awards, and
stack ownership. Unaer what conditions (e.g. stage of product life
cycle, market share. etc.) might different criiipensatton policies pay
off and what are the performance implications of changing pay policies?
Considering the resources devoted to employee compensation and its
management, we do not even know if the overall pay strategies adopted
make any difference. That is. we simply do not know whether managing
ciipensatson pays off.
Perhaps one reason is that cnpensatlon strategies do not operate
in a vacuum. Compensation is only one part, albeit an important part.
of a firm's total human resources strategy. Some firms, for example.
may emphasize contingent cc.opensation while others may emphasize
employment security. Disentangling the effects of one part of an
overafl pattern is difficult. But perhaps a more plausible reason for
the dismal state of knowledge is that industrial relation, researchers
haventattempted the research. It is to a suggestedresearchagenda
that we no'J turn.
IV. Concluding ReØjt
Our survey ofthe literature on the relationship between the
cwensation policies a firmpursuesand its economic performance leads
us InevitaDly to the conclusion that we know very little about this
relationship. Partially this is because compensation policies, byprofessional employees, technical
collar workers, and still further
hourly,orunionized and nonunloni
policies are often established at
rather than at the firm level; we
pointbelo%J.
Developing an understandIng o
forvariousoccupations instead of
enloyee groups is inçortant. On
strategically critical occupations
technology firms, or executives in
a firm's financial performance than
variations in pay policies for tnt
affectI ir'economicperformance
groups. On the other hand, execut
veryminor portion of total labor
thatshift portions of employeew
COLA'S OCsenioritybased) to cont
employees, office workess, and blue
distinctions made among salaried and
zedemployees. Finally. caiensation
the individual establ istunent level
returntothe inçlicatlons of this
I why firms pursue different policies
a single consistent policy for all
the one hand, It nay be that certain
such as engineers in hi.
most firms, have greater effects on
do other occupations. Thus
ical occupations are more likely to
than policies directed at other
lye cpensatlon usually makes up a
costs.Consequently any pay schemes
laborcosts frau entitlements (e.g.
ingency based(e.g.gainsharing or
35
their nature, are very caiplex. Firms differ in terms of the level of
their wage offers relative to their caupetitors. the returns within an
occupation that accrue Sje to seniority, their wage structures across
and within occupations, the level and mix of fringes they offer, their
use of indivithal or group incentive pay policies, the proceãires by
which wage increases are granted, and the processes enployed to
aflulnister caipensation. Moreover, within a firm different policies
may be followed for hi level executives, other managerial employees,36
lump 1mbonuses)seem likely to have noticeable effects on financial
performance.
The vast majority of the studies we have surveyed have tended to
focus only on a single dimension of caipensatlon policy. However, a
firits econc.nic performance is undoubtedly affected by its cc.npensation
policy in tnto. Future research needs to examine a firm'spolicy about
the various dimensions of cipensation policy simultaneously rather
than focusing on one policy to the exclusion of others. ipirically. a
firm's compensation strategy needs to be measured as a of
interrelated dimensions. Developing a scheme to parmaterize such a
complex policy in terms of a manageable number of dimensions will not
be a sinple task.
Of course, one mijit think that one could eliminate the need for
suchefforts bystudying ho., chans In one dimension of compensation
policy affect changes nfirm performance. The studies cited in
SectionII on the relationship between the adoption of particular
provãsions in executive crensation agreements and performance, or
those cited in Section III on the relationship between the adoption of
merit pay and public sector productivity, fall Into this class.
Unfortunately, the inferences one can draw fran such studios depend
crucially on whether other aspects of couipensation/industrial relations
policy changes at the same time; unless other critical aspects are
accounted for, causal inferences .,iiI be distorted. In addition, they
depend crucially on one's ability to control for other forces besides
compensation policy that might be expectedto influence performance.3?
Since adoption of a particular provision may we' I be influenced by
other forces, this is also not always easy to do.
An argument might be made that each pay policy dzmension may
affect a different outcme, thus diminishing the ailportance of
analyzing all dimensions sinwiltaneously. The pay level of a firm, for
example, may principally affect its ability to attract and retain a
stable work force and the price canpetitiveness of its products, while
a finns policy regarding the methods by which employees are
canpensated (e.g. team based incentives versus seniority) may directly
affect their productivity.If such a separation of theoretical effects
exists, then the need to consider sintiltaneously the entire pay
strategydiminishes. Ciim,n sense suggests ho,ever, that ewe
thresholds of all pay policies may haveto existfor the separate pay
dimensions to have any effect. Thus, for example, meritpayschemes
may have little effect on performance if the pay level is relatively
Theendogeneity of the adoption of particular provision, suggests
another thorny issue. Not only are changes over time in ocupensation
policy for a given firm likely to be nonrandcui. but so are differences
in ccupensation policies across firms at a point in time. There are
long literatures in both econn'cs and personnel that suggest the
situations in which different caipensation policies may prove optimal.
For example, the efficiency wage literature in economics suggests
that situations in which turnover costs are high, or the costs of
monitoring worker productivity are high, are the ones in which above
market—clearing wages and/or earnings profiles that increase with38
seniority may arise. The compensation literature in personnel suggests
that business units that exhibit simi ar business strategies or operate
in the same stages of pronuct life cycles will adopt similar
compensation policies, and that these policies will differ from those
of firms in the same industry in different stages or with different
Dusiness strategies.69 Thus, variations in calipensation policies
across firms may reflect conscious decisions by firms each trying to
maximize its economic welfare.
At first glance, we appear to be left with two options. On the
one hand, researchers can treat variations in cçensation policy
across farms as being randomly determined and ignore issues of possible
simultaneity. On the other hand, researchers can acknowledge that at
least sane of the observed variations in farms' caipensation policies
are purposeful and designed to effect a firms performance and then try
to empirically model the determinants and effects of these variations.
Given the latter, the effects of censation policy on firm
performance cart be estimated only in the context of a model that treats
these policies as being endogenously determined.
Our own preferences are to go the latter route. A start has
already been made by some research. For example, economists have tried
to see if empirical explanations exist for why the prevalence and
strength of cost—of—living adjustment clauses vary across union
contracts, why the fringe benefit/wage ratio varies over time and
across areas, or why the probab, ity of observing mandatory retirement
provisions and above market clearing wages varies across individuals.7039
Thesetypes of studies have only beguntoscratch the surface and much
moreresearch is needed on the determinants of compensation strategies.
We must stress, however, that pursuing this type of research will
not be easy for a number of reasons. On the one hand, it is not a
trivial matter to paraiitterize any particular caipensation policy. For
example, knowledge of the incentive/nonincentive pay dichotomy is
probably less useful than knowledge of the magnitudes of the incentives
that exist (i.e., the marginal return to the workers from altering
their behaviors). Similarly, how a plan is actually aministered may
De quite different frau what is recorded in written plan statements.
The mere process of collecting data on censation policies will
require considerable efforts.
On the other hand, once such data Is collected researchers mist
still develop enpirical models to explain variations In censation
policies. Unless such models have a good deal of explanatory power,
attempts to treat caipensation policies as encs,genous are unlikely to
lead to statistically precise estimates of the effects of ccAlpensatlon
policies on firm performance, both because of the Imprecision of the
instrunents' for caipensatlon policies that would result the
Indirect relationship between canpensation policy and ultimate
financial performance.
Indeed this problem is exacerbated by the fact that caipensation
policies are often set at the indivithal establts,rnt level and are
designed to effect establishment level variables such as absenteeisi,
thequality of new hires, turnover, and proo.ictiv,ty. Yet the40
financialperformance (stock market or accounting) measures available
are typically avaiiable only at the firm or corporate level.
These difficulties suggest a third option. Researchers might
focus on the establisinent level to estimate the effects of
cc.,çensationpalides on the outcaies that they are designed to
d,rectlyintiuence, such as recruitment, absenteeisn, and turnover and
individual, group and business unit performance;all inthe context of
modelsin which one attempts to control for theendogeneity of these
policies.Assuming that censatlon policies are shown to influence
theseoutcnes, establishment level data could then be used to estimate
the effects of these outcanes on total costs of production and thus on
underlying profitability. Related research on the effects of
industrial relations type policies on establishments' costs and
productivity in the autanobile and paper mill industries has recently
been undertaken and can serve as a starting point for these
endeavors.7 These related studies do ng. treat industrial relations
variables asendogenous, however, and it Is important that attempts be
madeto treat cnpensation policies as endogenous in future analyses.
Indeed, itmaybethatfinancial and stock market measures simply
have too much "noise in many situations to be useful measures of the
direct effects of various crensation policies and practices. By
considering only the ultimate' performance measures and ignoring the
intermediate outccqnes of cajipensation systems, we run the risk of
concluding nothing" matters when in fact what matters depends on the
outcQiies and models selected. Research on the effects of caupensation41
policies on tic-rn performance thus needs to focus on th firm—level
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7.See,forexample, Hilkovich & New,oan (2984), Richard B.
Freeman (1982).
B.Econcuilists have alsodevelopeda variety of theories to
explain why earnings S.ouldincreasewith seniority including those
based on Investments in training (e.g., Gary Becker (1975)) and those
based on providing incentives (e.g.. EdwardLazear(1979; 1981). Edward
Lazear and 9wrwin Rosen (1981). and Sherwin Rosen(1966).
9. For example. Donald WinIer (1980) shows that generous sick
leave pa1 ,cIes may encourage absenteeiTi. Wedo not discuss the
effectsofanother important employee benefit, pensions, ,n ourpaper
since they are the subject of another contribution (Steven Allen and
Ronert Clark) in this volume.
10.Theoreticalmodelsofpayment by grouporindividual output
also exist; a good survey of this literature is Lazear (1986).
12. See the papers in this volum,by Srian Becker and Craig Olson
onlabor relations and Waiter Gershenfeld on employee participation.
12. See La2ear (1986) for a survey.
13. See DavidCiscel and Thauas Carroll (1980) for a survey of
this literature.
24. See,for example, T. CcuØ.lin and P. Schmidt (1985), Peter
Kostiuk (19%), and Kevin J. Nürphy (1985a; 198%) (fotthcalling a;
forthcoming b) who focus on absolute measures of performance and Rick
Anti. and libbie &iith (1986) who focus on performance measures relative
to ccn,petltors.44
IS. See GeorgeBenson(1985) and T. CoughlanandP. ScSidt
(1985). Benson also studied the incane of executives in 29
conglanerates during the 1970—75 period and found that the annual gains
(or losses) they incurred duetochangesinthe value of their stock
holdings in their cpariie5 far exceeded their annual changes in
salaries. This further ties their 9ortunes" to their ca,lparLles'
fortunes.
Further cDnfirlnatlon that ownership matters canes fran William
Leweilen. Claudjo Loderer and N.ron Rosenfeld (1985), and Randall
Nørck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1986).Theformer examined
the abnormalstockmarket returns experienced by "bidder firms" in
mergers franthe'bid" to the approval1 date. They found these
returns positively related to the percentage of the bldderfirms"
stock ownedby senior management. Thus, executives' ownership of their
firms'securitieshelped to aligntheinterests of stockholders and
managers, at least in this case. The latter found that corporate
performance (in terms of both accounting profits and stock market
performance)was highest whenmanagement owns between 5 and 20 percent
of the corporation's stock. They hypothesize that when nai eramounts
areownea,managershave less incentive to pursue a profit maximizing
strategy.i*j le whenlarger amounts are owned,managers may feel more
secure and not work as hard.
16.Forexamples of such "learning' models, see Siiith Freeman
(1977).Mflton Harris and Bengt Hoimstran (1982) and Glenn McDonald
(I 982)
17. Murphy (forthcaning, b).45
18. See RocertKasson(197!).
39. See, S. Shagat. J. Brickley and R. Lease (3985). 3. Brickey,
S. Bhagat and R. Lease (1985), 0. Larcker (1983). and H. Tehranian and
J. Vaegeiein (1966).
20. Larcker (1983).
21. Bhagat, Brickley and Lease (1985).
22. See Jonathan Eaton and Harvey Rosen(1983)for one
theoretical model.
23. P. A. Lambert and D. F. Larcker (1985).
24. Charles Xnober (1986).
25. Ronald Ehrenberg and Steven Golterg (197?).
26. Gerald CQldsteln and Ronald Drenberg (1976).
2?. Ronald Ehrenberg, Richard Chayk,ski and Randy Ann Ehrenberg
(1986).
28. Jone Pearce. William Stevenson and JamesFerry(1985).
Performancemeasures used hereinclude the average length of timefor
claimsto be approved or denied, the percentageofclaims approved with
accurateaocumentatjon, and the percentage ofpost—entitlement actions
that took over30 days.
29. Infact,little attention has been given to howtherelative
cipensation levels of topexecutiveswithin a firm are set and whether
the structure across executives provides proper incentives. Edward
Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) do present theoretical arguments why At
may ne optimal to have ccwpensation differences across ranke that far
exceed the relative productivity differences across the positions but
no empirical work on interfirm variations In executive salary46
structures has Deen undertaken -
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